in detail the methods of conducting the rice business and the manner in which the rough rice market and the clean rice market is made, showing that it would be utterly impossible for any rice miller to accurately determine whether he had made a profit or a loss on any given transaction, much less prove whether he had passed the tax, or any part thereof, on. Petitioner also introduced in evidence the affidavit of Homer L. Bruce, a practicing attorney at the bar at Houston, Texas, setting out in detail the proceedings under a complaint brought by the Secretary of Agriculture to revoke the license of a rice mill under the Act in effect prior to the present Act. The Secretary of Agriculture sought to revoke the license of this mill for failure to sell clean rice and rice products processed from rough rice at a price approximately 89 cents higher than the price paid for the rough rice. The affidavit showed that, although the government was able to prove the cost of the rough rice and to trace the particular rough rice into various "mixes" of clean rice and the price procured for these "mixes" of clean rice, it was never able to prove that the price procured for the clean rice processed from the particular lot of rough rice, was not 89 cents more than the price paid for the rough rice, because of the fact that clean rice is customarily sold in "mixes" of various lots of rice and there was no way to allocate the price procured for the mixed rice sold to the various lots of rough rice which went into the mix.

In the meantime, petitioner alleges that for the foregoing reasons and those set forth in its said

bill of complaint in said cause, and because the judge of said District Court in his said order dismissed said bill of complaint and refused to grant petitioner the injunction prayed for pending the appeal in this case, and because the Circuit Court of Appeals has denied petitioner's application for an injunction pending the hearing of its appeal, and because it will be several months before said Circuit Court of Appeals will hear its appeal and because the Circuit Court of Appeals in its opinion and order denying petitioner its said injunction has virtually decided and disposed of petitioner's appeal for all practical purposes, the respondent herein will, to the irreparable damage and loss of the petitioner herein, proceed to collect the said taxes for September, 1935, which are now due and unpaid, from petitioner, and said taxes for subsequent months, unless restrained by a preliminary injunction granted by this Court. The petitioner alleges that not only has it no complete remedy at law, but in fact no remedy at law at all, for the reasons hereinabove set forth and set forth more in detail in said bill of complaint, that it is faced with the alternative of paying the tax with the certainty that no remedy at law exists for its recovery in case it be held that it was unconstitutionally assessed, or of refusing to pay and running the risk of becoming liable for the heavy civil and criminal penalties provided in the Act, and that the said judge of said District Court should not have dismissed said bill of complaint, but should have overruled the same, and upon the hearing should have granted the prelimi-

nary injunction as prayed for in said bill of complaint, and the Circuit Court of Appeals should have granted petitioner the injunction pending its appeal.

Petitioner would further show that there is now pending in the Supreme Court of the United States a case involving the constitutionality of the said Agricultural Adjustment Act, being the same case in which the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit declared the Act to be unconstitutional, and that the Supreme Court has set said cause for oral argument on Monday, December 9, 1935; that a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States upon the validity of the said Act may be expected within a reasonable time thereafter; that the first benefit payment to farmers provided for in said Act has been made, and that under the standard form of contract between the Secretary of Agriculture and rice farmers no further payment is due until such time after December 1, 1935, as the secretary shall determine and declare what further amount of benefit payments shall be made and when they shall be made; that the taxes to be collected under said Act are for the purpose of making these benefit payments and that since the Secretary of Agriculture need make no further benefit payments until such time after December 1, 1935, as may be fixed by him, the delay of the Government in collecting these taxes which might be occasioned by the granting of the injunction prayed for herein will not occasion any injury to the Government nor will it unduly interfere with the achievement of the program set out in said Act if the Act be held constitutional. On the

other hand, as hereinabove alleged, great and irreparable damage will be done to petitioner in the event the law is held unconstitutional unless the injunction hereinafter prayed for is granted.

Petitioner further shows that it is informed that every other Circuit Court of Appeals to consider the question, namely, the Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth, has granted injunctions pending appeal contrary to the action herein by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Petitioner further shows that unless an injunction pending appeal be granted so as to preserve the *status quo,* the subject-matter of the suit will be lost and the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court defeated. Such injunction is necessary to preserve the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and in order that petitioner may enjoy the just fruits of a favorable decision herein.

The petitioner states that it is ready and willing to give any reasonable bond or other security that may be required by any order of this Court, including the deposit from month to month of the amount of tax due, in a depository to be designated by the Court, and therefore prays that this Court make an order granting petitioner a preliminary injunction enjoining and restraining the respondent, and his successors in office, from assessing or collecting or attempting to assess or collect from petitioner in any manner whatsoever, whether by lien or jeopardy or distraint proceeding, in court or otherwise, the said processing taxes for the month of September and subsequent months and any other processing taxes

under and pursuant to said Agricultural Adjustment Act upon rice processed by petitioner, and any interest or penalty on account of petitioner's failure to pay said processing taxes, and from imposing or giving notice of intention to impose any lien for said taxes upon the property, real or personal, of the petitioner, pending the hearing of petitioner's petition to this Honorable Court for a writ of certiorari in this cause, and if said petition is granted, pending the hearing of this cause by this Honorable Court, and upon such conditions and terms as to this Court may seem just.

HOMER L. BRUCE,

JOHN P. BULLINGTON,
*Attorneys for Petitioner.*
Houston, Texas.

BAKER, BOTTS, ANDREWS & WHARTON,
*Of Counsel.*
Houston, Texas.

STATE OF TEXAS,
COUNTY OF HARRIS.

Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared John P. Bullington, known to me and who being by me duly sworn, deposed and said on his oath as follows: That he is one of counsel for petitioner in the above cause, and has read the foregoing motion; that he is personally familiar with the matters and things therein alleged, and that the same are true except as to such matters as are alleged on information and belief, and as to them he believes them to be true. He further states that he is a member of the bar of this Honorable Court and has made a careful examination of applicable decisions of this Honorable Court and is of the opinion that the relief herein prayed for should be granted under such decisions.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this the 8th day of November, A. D. 1935.

[SEAL]

RAYMOND NEILSON,
*Notary Public in and for Harris County, Texas.*

# Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1935

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## No. 559

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A. B. DORE
PETITIONER,

v.

RUFUS W. FONTENOT, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ACTING UNITED STATES COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE FOR THE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA,
RESPONDENT.

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## MOTION FOR INJUNCTION TO PRESERVE STATUS QUO

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HOMER L. BRUCE,
JOHN P. BULLINGTON,
*Attorneys for Petitioner.*
Houston, Texas.

BAKER, BOTTS, ANDREWS & WHARTON,
*Of Counsel.*
Houston, Texas.

No.....

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## MOTION FOR INJUNCTION TO PRESERVE STATUS QUO

TO THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, *Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:*

Comes now A. B. Dore, by his counsel, Homer L. Bruce and John P. Bullington, and respectfully states that petitioner on October 25, 1935, brought a bill in equity in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans Division, entitled A. B. Dore, Plaintiff, v. Rufus W. Fontenot, Individually and as